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A B S T R A C T The c o n v e n t i o n a l f o r m a l i z a t i o n of l o g i c p r o g r a m m i n g i n 
c l a s s i c a l l o g i c e x p l a i n s v e r y c o n v i n c i n g l y t h e b a s i c p r i n c i p l e s of t h i s p r o -
g r a m m i n g s t y l e . H o w e v e r , i t gives no easy o r i n t u i t i v e e x p l a n a t i o n s f o r 
t h e t r e a t m e n t of n e g a t i o n . L o g i c P r o g r a m m i n g h a n d l e s n e g a t i o n t h r o u g h 
t h e s o - c a l l e d ^ N e g a t i o n as F a i l u r e " i n f e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e w h i c h i s r a t h e r 
u n c o n v e n t i o n a l f r o m t h e v i e w p o i n t of c l a s s i c a l l o g i c . D e s p i t e i t s n o n c l a s -
s i c a l n a t u r e , t h i s i n f e r e n c e p r i n c i p l e c a n n o t be a v o i d e d i n p r a c t i c e . The 
a p p r o p r i a t e a p p l i c a t i o n of N e g a t i o n as F a i l u r e r e q u i r e s e i t h e r s y n t a c t i c a l 
r e s t r i c t i o n s , o r s i g n i f i c a n t changes i n t h e semantics of l o g i c p r o g r a m s . 
I n t h i s a r t i c l e , we defend t h e thesis t h a t these s y n t a c t i c a l r e s t r i c t i o n s o r 
s e m a n t i c a l changes a r e n a t u r a l l y a n d s i m p l y e x p l a i n e d by o b s e r v i n g t h a t 
l o g i c p r o g r a m m i n g i n f a c t i m p l e m e n t s no m o r e t h a n a c o n s t r u c t i v e f r a g -
ment of c l a s s i c a l l o g i c . R e l y i n g o n a " C o n d i t i o n a l F i x p o i n t P r o c e d u r e " , 
we first define a m o n o t o n i c i n f e r e n c e p r o c e d u r e f o r l o g i c p r o g r a m s w i t h 
n e g a t i o n t h a t a r e c o n s i s t e n t i n t h i s c o n s t r u c t i v e f r a g m e n t . Then we show 
how t h i s p r o c e d u r e c a n be extended i n t o a " T e m a r y F i x p o i n t P r o c e d u r e " 
f o r g e n e r a l p r o g r a m s . T h i s fixpoint p r o c e d u r e defines a t e m a r y l o g i c se-
m a n t i c s f o r s y n t a c t i c a l l y u n r e s t r i c t e d l o g i c p r o g r a m s . F i n a l l y , we a r g u e 
t h a t t h e c o n s t r u c t i v e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n of l o g i c p r o g r a m m i n g a l s o gives a s i m -
p l e a n d n a t u r a l e x p l a n a t i o n of m e t a - p r o g r a m m i n g . R e l y i n g o n t h i s v i e w 
of m e t a - p r o g r a m m i n g , we specify different f o r m s of r e f l e c t i v e r e a s o n i n g , 
i n p a r t i c u l a r default r e a s o n i n g . 
1. Introduction 
Since P r o l o g (Programming in L o g i c ) has been developed by A . Colmerauer and R. 
Kowalski, the concept of "logic programming" refers to a certain type of declara-
tive programming languages. Logic programs are formalized as relationship between 
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terms in a logical theory [vEK76, Kow79]. This view gives a very convincing ex-
planation of the basic principles of declarative programming languages, which is 
independent from any inference principle. However, this formalization proves to be 
inappropriate as soon as additional features - language constructs or syntactical re-
strictions - are considered, that are necessary for practical applications of declarative 
languages. 
Negation is such a construct. Its processing, which could be considered rather unlog-
ical by mathematicians, has led either to restrict the syntax of logic programs, or to 
formalize their semantics in ternary logics. In this paper, we show that these syntac-
tical restrictions and nonclassical semantics are naturally and intuitively explained 
by referring to a rather simple fragment of classical logic. 
This restricted logic is in fact the original form of mathematical logic. It is called 
"constructive logic" because it rejects existence proofs that do not explicitly con-
struct the mathematical object, the existence of which is proven. Before Cantor, 
the restriction to constructive proofs was almost taken for granted. B y applying 
its diagonalization principle, Cantor has shown that an additional number can be 
defined from any enumerable set of real numbers. Cantor's definition is however 
not a construction. Therefore his proof has been first strongly criticized. The ar-
ticle [Cal79] provides an easy introduction to this part of mathematics and to its 
history. Although nonconstructive proofs are nowadays no longer criticized, con-
structive reasoning has survived in mathematics. Various constructive logics have 
been developed aside the main stream of conventional mathematics. We do not need 
to ref er to these theories, whose notations and vocabularies are often discouraging. 
We shall only make use of the original and quite intuitive notion of constructive 
proof. 
The formalization of logic programming in constructive logic is not only useful for in-
vestigating negation. It gives also a very natural explanation of meta-programming. 
From the constructive viewpoint, it is rather natural to define theories or programs, 
whose variables ränge over formulas. Since in constructive logic formulas represent 
themselves but no platonistic objects, it is possible to interpret meta-programs as 
first-order, constructive theories. This constructive view of meta-programming is 
especially useful for axiomatizing non-classical logics such as, for example, autoepis-
temic or default logics. Such axiomatizations can also be used as implementations. 
Some authors have already observed the link between logic programming and con-
structive reasoning. G. Huet suggests in [Hue86] to view Prolog Interpreters as proof 
synthetisers of a sequent calculus - a kind of constructive logic. D. Bojadziev notices 
similarities between Prolog and constructive reasoning in the short article [Boj86]. 
Constructive aspects of Prolog are investigated by C. Beckstein in relationship with 
T r u t h M a i n t e n a n c e Systems in [Bec88]. J . -Y . Girard, Y . Lafont, and P. Taylor sug-
gest in [GLT89] a possible relationship between logic programming and linear logic 
[Gir87] - a constructive logic recently proposed by J . -Y . Girard. In [Bry89a] the 
view of logic programming as a constructive fragment of classical logic was used, 
for the first time as far as we know, to intuitively motivating syntactical restrictions 
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like stratiflcation or ternary semantics. We do not know about any work relying on 
constructive logic for investigating meta-programming. 
This article consists of seven sections, the first of which is this introduction. In 
Section 2, we recall the usual formalization of logic programming without negation. 
Then, we consider in Section 3 the processing of negation and the difKculties resulting 
from it. We define a "Conditional Fixpoint Operator" in Section 4. We show how 
to use this Operator for monotonically generating consequences from programs with 
negation that are constructively consistent. We show how syntactical properties like 
stratiflcation [ABW88, Van88] or local stratiflcation [Prz88] are easily motivated in 
constructive logic: They are necessary conditions for constructive consistency. In 
Section 5, we propose a ternary valued semantics for syntactically unrestricted logic 
programs. We define a "Ternary Fixpoint Procedure" for this semantics. Finally, 
we propose an interpretation of meta-programming in constructive logic in Section 
6. As examples of this interpretation, we show how reflective inference principles 
like modal and default logics can be specified as meta-programs. Section 7 is a 
conclusion. 
This article is translated and adapted from the text of a talk given at the l s t Work-
shop Information Systems and Artificial Intelligence [Bry90]. 
2. Logic Programming without Negation 
The inference principles of logic programming are modus ponens and the special-
ization rule. B y modus ponens, a formula G is derived from two formulas F and 
F =$> G. If c is a constant in the universe under consideration, specialization gives 
rise to deriving F[c] from a universal formula Vx F[x]. These two inference rules 
are combined in the resolution principle [Rob65a], the knowledge of which is not 
necessary for our purposes. 
The two inference principles modus ponens and specialization can be more or less 
directly implemented. The simplest approach consists in applying first the special-
ization rule for eliminating the universal quantifiers. A formula Vxyz p(x, y) A q(y, z) 
r(x, z) - usually written as r(x, z) «— p(x, y) A q(y, z) in logic programming -
is for example specialized by instantiating its variables in all possible ways over the 
universe under consideration. This approach which applies the two inference rules 
specialization and modus ponens separately and successively is usually retained in 
T r u t h M a i n t e n a n c e Systems [Doy79, dK86]. A major drawback is the number of 
useless instantiated formulas that are, in most cases, generated. 
A significant improvement consists in relying on the premise of the clauses - i.e., 
on p(x, y) A q(y, z) in the above-mentioned example - for restricting specialization: 
Only those instances of the clause r(x, z) <— p(x, y) A q(y, z) are needecl that make 
the conjunction p(x, y) A q(y, z) true. Note that no subsequent instanciations 
are necessary if all variables appear in the premises, i.e., if the clause is ränge-
r e s t r i c t e d . It is common to describe this improvement for range-restricted clauses as 
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a special type of resolution, u n i t h y p e r r e s o l u t i o n [Rob65b, vEK76]. This approach 
is called f o r w a r d or b o t t o m - u p reasoning, for it somehow follows the direction of the 
implication sign in the formulas or in the clauses. A remarkable efficiency can be 
achieved in this way, which applies specialization no more than necessary. 
Foliowing van Emdem and Kowalski [vEK76], the denotational semantics of a logic 
program is traditionally defined in terms of bottom-up reasoning. The semantics of 
a logic program without negation P is defined in terms of the facts that are derivable 
from P by iterated applications of bottom-up reasoning. A facts which is derivable 
from a specialization of a clause in P by one application of modus ponens is called 
a d i r e c t consequence of P. The set of the direct consequences of P is noted T(P). 
T | n (P ) denotes the set of facts that are derivable from instances of clauses in P by 
at most n applications of the modus ponens rule. This set is inductively defined as 
follows: 
TT° (P) = P 
T | n + 1 ( P ) = T(TTn(P)) U Tt n (P) 
The sets of all facts that are derivable from P is: 
Un€N TP (P) = TT 0 (P) u TT 1 (P) U ... U T f n (P) u ... 
It is denoted T f " (P). This set is the fixpoint of the function T f on the program P. 
The function T | and the computation of its fixpoints are traditionally used for 
formalizing the semantics of logic programs without negation. Despite of an ele-
gant analogy between model theory in logic and denotational semantics of programs 
[vEK76], it is worth to notice that the computation of a fixpoint T|U'(P) is in prin-
ciple a forward reasoning procedure. 
This procedure has two forms, often called n a i v e and s e m i - n a i ' v e methods. The 
na'ive method computes the sets T | n (P) for increasing values of n. The semi-naive 
methods improves the na'ive methods by only Computing thoses facts of T j n + 1 ( P ) 
that have at least one premise in 
T | n (P) \ TT 1 1" 1!?) 
This aims at restricting the computation of T f n + 1 ( P ) as much as possible to that of 
T | n + 1 ( P ) \ T | n (P) 
The Operators T and T | are monotonic on programs without negation: If Pi C P 2 , 
then T(P a ) C T(P 2) and T | (Pi) C TT(P 2). 
In order to avoid the generation of useless facts and to restrict as much as possible the 
generation to relevant facts, so-called backward or t o p - d o w n reasoning methods are 
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applied. It is a quite intuitive fact, that forward reasoning cannot take into account 
the constants occurring in queries. This inference technique indeed considers the 
queries at the very end. As opposed backward reasoning methods start from the 
queries. They can therefore propagate the constants occurring in queries. 
Backward reasoning is close to the so-called problem reduction reasoning paradigm. 
For example, in order to prove a fact p(a), a backward reasoning methods searches 
for all clauses whose conclusions can be unified with p(a). For example, the clause 
p(x) <- q(x) A r(x) 
would be selected. In contrast, the following clauses would not be retained: 
s(x) *- t(x) A u(x) 
p(b) - v(x) 
The premises of the selected clauses - also called "bodies" - are in turn similarly 
processed. 
A particular form of backward reasoning, based on linear resolution (see, e.g., 
[Sti86]), gives the principle - or the so-called operational semantics - of the P r o l o g 
programming language [Llo87]. Logic programming is however neither restricted to 
linear resolution, nor to backward reasoning. In order to correctly handle recursive 
programs, a few new procedures have been defined in the last few years, among 
others the m a g i c sets m e t h o d [BMSU86, BR87] and SLDAL-resolution [Vie89]. It 
has been recently observed that these methods all implement the same nonlinear 
backward reasoning principle [Bry89b, Man89]. 1 Forward reasoning is for example 
applied in abstract interpretation [GCS88, BD88]. 
It is worth noting that logic programming (without negation) cannot prove all the-
orems of (negation-free) logical theories. From the clauses 
p(a) 
p(f(x)) <- p(x) 
it is possible to derive the following property: 
VneN* p(f n(x)) 
This universal formulas is however not derived from a logic program, because the 
induction principle is missing in logic programming. 
1Some methods i m p l e m e n t back ward reasoning in a language of clauses that are processed 
forward. This property of the p r o g r a m m i n g language used does however not characterize the 
I m p l e m e n t a t i o n . 
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Disjunctive formulas like a V b cannot be expressed in logic programs. (The logical 
dependency of a fact a from b or from c can however be expressed by means of two 
clauses a <— b and a <— c.) In logic programming, a disjunctive statement 
a V b 
can only be proven by proving a or by proving b. Classical logic gives rise to other 
proofs, for example based on the t e r t i o n o n d a t u r or excluded middle principle. 
The above-mentioned restrictions are all constructive. The formalization of logic 
programming in füll classical logic is already questionable for programs without 
negation. A n interpretation in constructive logic would be more natural. 
3. A Non-Classical Inference Principle: Negation as Failure 
In logic programming, a negated formula - i F is considered proven when F is not 
provable. This inference principle is called n e g a t i o n as f a i l u r e [Cla78]. This manner 
to derive negative Information can be called a reflective inference principle, for the 
reasoning System reflects on its own knowledge. It departs from classical logic which 
treats negative and positive expressions similarly. 
The negation as failure principle is rather intuitive. It is often used in every-day life. 
For example, one concludes that there is no direct flight from Nürnberg to Stuttgart 
if one finds none in the time table. This reasoning is nonmonotonic: If new flights 
are created, negative conclusions might be no longer valid. 
The negation as failure principle has been introduced for relational databases under 
the name of c l o s e d w o r l d a s s u m p t i o n in the seventies [Rei78]. Because it is natural 
and also because it gives rise to an efficient backward evaluation of negated expres-
sions, this principle has been retained. It is quite interesting to notice that inference 
principles that are, like negation as failure, unconventional for mathematicians, but 
rather intuitive for nonmathematicians, have been proposed within constructive log-
ics. 
Negation as failure is very close to default reasoning [Rei80]. One can for example 
see the condition r(x) in the clause p(x) <— q(x) A - i r (x) as an exception for the 
negation-free clause p(x) <— q(x). Since negation as failure is a reflective inference 
principle, it is also related to modal nonmonotonic logics - e.g., autoepistemic logic 
[Moo85]. 
Negation as failure poses problems for several reasons. In classical logic, expressions 
such as a <= b and a V ->b are equivalent. As a consequence, implications like 
p <= r A -iq 
and 
36 
q r A ~»p 
are also equivalent. Are however the following clauses also equivalent? 
p <— r A ->q 
q <— r A -ip 
Obviously not: From a program consisting of the fact r and first clause, p and -»q 
are derived. In contrast ->p and q follow from r and the second clause. 
In constructive logic, the formulas a <= b and a V -«b are not equivalent. The im-
plication a b means only that a can be proven as soon as b is provable. If impli-
cations are only interpreted in this constructive manner, an implication a <= -^a is 
always false: a and -»a cannot be both provable. The constructive interpretation of 
implications gives a natural explanation, why the two clauses considered above do 
not have the same effect: They are not constructively equivalent. 
Another difficulty caused by the negation as failure principle is the nonmonotonicity 
of the Operator T. Consider the program P = {p <— ->q, q <— r, r}. Since q $ P and 
r £ P, we have T(P) = {p, q}. The derivation of p is however questionable because 
it relies on - iq. The later derivation of q contradicts this assumption. The Operator 
T therefore is not suited to defining the denotational semantics of programs with 
negation. In the next section, we propose a monotonic fixpoint procedure for such 
logic programs. 
4. Monotonie Reasoning on Programs with Negation 
In order to restore monotonic reasoning on programs with negation, one has to 
delay the evaluation of negated expressions. Instead of generating facts, as does the 
Operator T, we propose to collect the negative premises for later evaluations. 
The facts a and b and the clause c <— a A b A -*c give for example rise to deriving 
the clause c «— ->c. From the two following clauses 
a <— b A ->c 
b <- d 
one can derive the clause a <— - ic A ->d. Nonground clauses are appropriately in-
stanciated and similarly processed. 
We first illustrate on an example the Operator based on this principle. Then, we recall 
the formal deflnition from the article [Bry89a]. Since the new Operator generates a 
kind of conditional facts, we call it "Conditional Fixpoint Operator" and denote it 
T c . 
Let P be the following logic program: 
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p(x) <— q(x) A -•t(x) A - T ( X ) 
q(x) <— s(x) A -"t(x) 
r(x) <— s(x) A _ i u(x) 
s(a) 
s(b) u(b) 
u(c) 
Düring a first phase, the following clauses - or conditional facts - are generated, 
until a fixpoint is reached. 
Then, in a second phase, these clauses are simplified. The literals -«t(a) and -•t(b) 
are eliminated, since there are neither facts nor clauses defining t. Similarly, -<u(a) 
is eliminated. The r(a) and the clause p(a) <— -«r(a) result from these first elimina-
tions. Since r(a) has been already obtained, this clause is useless: We eliminate it 
as well. Pursuing this elimination process results in the following set of facts: 
The definition of the T c Operator given below makes use of a few notations. Given a 
literal or a conjunction of literals B , 'pos(B)' will denote the conjunction of positive 
literals in B or, if this is the case, the only positive literal in B . Similarly, 'neg(B)' 
will denote the conjunction of negative literals or the single negative literal in B . If 
B does not contain any positive literal (negative literal, resp.) 'pos(B)' ('neg(B)', 
resp.) is defined as 'true\ A clause, the body of which is 'true' or a conjunction of 
negative literals, will be called a "conditional fact". 
Definition 1: 
Let P be a logic program. A conditional fact 
T c T ^ P ) : P T c | 2 ( P ) : T c T^P) 
q(a) <- -t(a) 
q(b) - -t(b) 
r(a) <— ->u(a) 
r(b) <- -.u(b) 
p(a) <— -it(a) A ~T(a) 
p(b) « - -.t(b) A -.r(b) 
{q(a), q(b), r(a), p(b)} 
C: ka <- neg(B<r) C i A ... A Cj A ... A Q 'n 
is a conditional consequence of P - i.e., C € T C (P) - if: 
1. There is a clause (A <— B) in P 
2. There is a Substitution a instanciating the variables in (A <— B) with 
ground terms of the language of P 
3. pos(B)cr = true 
or pos(B) = A i A ... A A , A . . . A n (n > 1) and for all i £ {1, n} there 
is a clause Aj <— Ci in P, or C\ = true and A i is a fact in P. 
Since negative literals are not evaluated during the computation of T C (P) , we have: 
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Proposition: 
The Operator T C (P) is monotonic. It has a unique fixpoint. 
The Conditional Fixpoint Procedure is defined as follows: 
Definition 2: 
Let P be a logic program (without function Symbols). The Conditional 
Fixpoint Procedure consists of two successive phases: 
1. The fixpoint T C (P) is first computed. 
2. The set T C (P) is reduced to a set of facts by applying the following 
rewriting rules: 
The reduction phase of the Conditional Fixpoint Procedure always terminates, as 
soon as the program under consideration is constructively consistent [Bry89a]. This 
condition prevents that a clause, the premise of which is the negation of the conclu-
sion - e.g., p(a) <— -«p(a) - is derivable. In the next section, we show the procedure 
of Definition 2 can be adapted to also handle logic programs that are constructively 
inconsistent. 
The extension of Definition 2 to logic programs with function symbols is possible. 
It requires however more complex notations. For the sake of simplicity, we do not 
give it here. 
The Operator T c does not perform nonmonotonic deductions. However, consequences 
of a program P can still become invalid in a program extending P with additional 
facts or clauses. 
Düring the last few years, various classes of syntactically restricted logic programs 
with negation have been proposed, among others hierarchical, stratified [ABW88, 
Van88], and locally stratified [Prz88] programs. The constructive formalization of 
logic programming gives a rather simple motivation for these syntactical restrictions: 
There are necessary conditions for constructive consistency [Bry89a]. Previously, 
these syntactical restrictions were only procedurally motivated. 
(F +- true) F 
F A true -> F 
false A F —* false 
true A F -> F 
F A false —» false 
(F <- false) - 4 A 
->F —> true 
if F js neither a fact, nor the 
conclusion of a clause. 
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5. Ternary Logic for Unrestricted Programs 
The fixpoint semantics of logic programs with negation described in the previous 
section in terms of the Operator T c does not take into account logic programs that 
are constructively inconsistent. In practice, it is however often desirable to accept 
such programs by somehow "ignoring" their inconsistent parts. In this section, we 
propose a semantics for general programs which formalizes this intention of "over-
seing" inconsistencies. 
This semantics is defined by slightly modifying the reduction phase of the Condi-
tional Fixpoint Procedure. Clauses such as p(a) <— -> p(a) that are false from the 
constructive viewpoint are simply eliminated, and the facts that are "defined" by 
such clauses - p(a) in case of p(a) <— -» p(a) - are marked as "unknown". They are 
thus distinguished from facts without any definition. The negation as failure princi-
ple is maintained by interpreting as "false" those facts that have neither consistent, 
nor inconsistent definitions. We first illustrate this modification of the Conditional 
Fixpoint Procedure on an example. 
Let p be the following logic program: 
p <— a q <— ->p a 
p <— q r <— -> r 
From P the following marked facts are derived: a: true, p: true, r: unknown, and 
q: false. This semantics is called ternary or 3-valued, for it has three truth values. 
The following inequalities express, in the usual formalism of ternary logics, the 
precedences between the truth values: 
true > unknown > false 
A fact is not assigned the truth value "false" as soon as it can be proven - i.e., 
marked "true" - or marked "unknown". Similarly, as soon as a fact is proven, it is 
removed from the facts marked "unknown". 
We call "Ternary Fixpoint Procedure" the reasoning informally described above. 
Like the Conditional Fixpoint Procedure, it is based on the T c Operator. It is 
formally defined as follows: 
Definition 3: 
Let P be a logic program (without function Symbols). The Ternary 
Fixpoint Procedure consists of three successive phases: 
1. The fixpoint T c f(P) is first computed. 
2. The set T c f (P) is then reduced to a set of marked facts by applying 
the following rewriting rules, where F denotes an atom: 
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F -> (F: true) (F <- true) (F: true) 
true A F -> F F A true -> F 
F A false —• false false A F —> false 
(F <- false) A 
(F *- -,F) -> (F: unknown) 
->F —» true 
if F is neither a fact, nor a fact marked 
"true", nor the conclusion of a clause 
in P 
3. Finally, all facts that are neither marked "true", nor "unknown" are 
marked "false"; moreover "unknown" marks are removed from facts also 
marked "true". 
It is worth noting that ternary logics are constructive logics. Ternary logics for 
unrestricted logic programs have been defined in various ways, for example in [Fit85, 
GL88, VRS88, BF90, Van89]. They do not significantly differ from the above-
defined semantics. Moreover, the Ternary Fixpoint Procedure can easily be adapted 
to reflect these differences. Some authors make use of similar concepts as the T c 
Operator, which was introduced in [Bry89a]. 
Like the Conditional Fixpoint Procedure, and in the same way, the Ternary Fixpoint 
Procedure can be extended to logic programs with function symbols. 
6. Application: Reflective Reasoning 
Constructive logic is not platonistic. Constructive reasoning does not ref er to any 
meaning of the formulas, but to the formulas themselves. A frequent example of 
this way of thinking is the hypothesis that distinct constants denote distinct objects. 
This hypothesis is called U n i q u e Name A x i o m in database theory. In logic program-
ming, this hypothesis is conveyed through the restriction to Herbrand models. It is 
questionable, whether human thinking is restricted in a similar way. We shall not 
try to ans wer this philosophical issue. We just notice that constructive reasoning is 
well suited to artificial intelligence: A Computer just constructs. 
From the constructive viewpoint, it is rather natural to define logic programs with 
variables ranging over formulas. Such programs are called "meta-programs" [SS86b]. 
They are often seen as second-order theories. The constructive viewpoint, however, 
suggests another formalization. Since the variables of meta-programs represent for-
mulas, but no mathematical objects defined by these formulas, meta-programs can 
be formalized in first-order logic - see in particular [End72], pp. 281-289. 
Meta-programming is a mean to overcome restrictions of logic programming, for it 
gives rise to specifying within logic programming, reasoning principles different from 
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that of logic programming. We illustrate this point by giving some examples of meta-
programs that implement some forms of reflective and nonmonotonic reasoning. 
Logic programming does not give rise to deriving universal formulas. The following 
meta-program specify an evaluation of universal formulas in implicative form. The 
specification is sound and complete for restricted universal quantification [Bry89c]. 
forall(x, y =>> z) <— -> (y A -> z) 
Let F be the formula Vx p(x) =>• q(x) and P the program {p(a), p(b), q(a), q(b), 
q(c)}. When y is instanciated with p(x), and z with q(x), a backward evaluation 
of forall(x, y z) binds the variable x successively with all values in p-facts. For 
each instantiation of x, q(x) is checked. It is worth noting, that this way to prove 
universal formulas is constructive. 
We show by means of a simple example how a form of autoepistemic reasoning can 
be easily implemented by a logic meta-program. 
Let A , B , and C be three agents. assume that A believes all what B believes, provided 
that C does not believe it. Assume also that B believes everything provable. Assume 
finally that C believes everything simple. We assume that an information is simple 
if it is provable without applying modus ponens. 
believes(A, x) «— believes(B, x) A -» believes(C, x) 
believes(C, x) <— fact(x) 
believes(B, x) <— proven(x) 
believes(C, x) *— simple(x) 
simple(Fi A F 2 ) <— s i m p l e ^ ) A simple(F 2) 
simple(F) <- fact(F) 
Finally, we propose a meta-program for default reasoning. General rules are assumed 
to be stored is facts by means of a predicate "clause". For example, 
clause(flies(x) <— bird(x)) 
means that birds normally fly. Exceptions to general rules are assumed to be ex-
pressed by using an "except" predicate. Since penguins are birds, but do not fly, we 
have: 
except (flies (penguin)) 
The following meta-program implements default reasoning: 
proved(x) 4 - clause(x <— y) A proved(y) A -> except(x) 
proved(xi A x a ) <— proved(xi) A proved(x2) 
proved(x) <— fact(x) 
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From the following object-program 
clause(flies(x) <— bird(x)) 
bird(crow) 
bird(penguin) 
except(flies(penguin)) 
the above-defined meta-program derives only the fact flies(crow). 
It is worth noting that exceptions - i.e., "except" facts - can as well be defined 
by means of clauses. These clauses in turn can admit exceptions. Processing such 
"nested exceptions" by means of the Conditional or Ternary Fixpoint Procedures 
results in the hierarchical reasoning suggested by Poole in [Poo98] for default reason-
ing Systems. Thus, logic meta-programming is very convenient to easily specifying 
- and implementing - sophisticated default logics. 
We illustrate the notion of "nested exceptions" on an example. Cars must stop if 
the traffic light is red. This rule however does not apply to ambulance cars provided 
they are in Service. This last restriction - i.e., "in service" - may be viewed as 
an exception to the derogatory rule for ambulance cars. In the formalism of the 
above-defined meta-program, this example can be represented as follows: 
stop <— red 
except(stop) <— ambulance 
except (except (stop)) <— after-service 
Instead of refering to predicates - "stop" and "except(stop)" in the previous example 
- exceptions can also ref er to clauses. This requires a slight modification of the 
formalism. This is easily achieved by, for example, naming the clauses and modifying 
the "proved" meta-program. We assume that a clause x <— y is uniquely assigned an 
identifier z. We also assume that clauses named in this way can be retrieved using 
a binary predicate "clause": 
clause(z, x <— y) 
The following meta-program handles exceptions to clauses: 
proved(x) <— clause(z, x «— y) A proved(y) A -> except(z) 
proved(xi A x a ) <— proved(xi) A proved (x 2) 
proved (x) +— fact(x) 
Döing so, different exceptions can be given for "stop", depending on the stop-rule 
under consideration. Such a refined representation give rises, for example, to express 
that there is no derogation to stopping at level crossing when a train arrives. The 
following clauses formalize this example: 
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clause(l, stop *— red) 
clause(2, stop <— level-crossing A train) 
clause(3, except(l) <— ambulance) 
clause(4, except(except(l)) *— after-service) 
Clearly, some applications might require to handle both, exceptions to clauses as 
well as exceptions to predicates, depending on the predicates. We leave specifying 
the corr->:ponding meta-program to the reader, for it is quite easy. 
Because it gives rise to easily refining various deduction schemes, we argue that meta-
programming is very convenient for defining and implementing complex reasoning, 
especially nonmonotonic reasoning Systems. 
7. Conclusion 
In this article, we have proposed a particular interpretation of logic programs. Ac-
cording to this interpretation, logic programming departs from modern mathematics. 
It restricts reasoning to certain inference rules, in a manner which corresponds to a 
primitive form of mathematical logic, constructive logic. It provides us with rather 
natural explanations for several features of logic programming. 
In particular, it explains very naturally syntactical restrictions such as "stratiflca-
tion" and "local stratiflcation" that were proposed for overcoming difficulties result-
ing from the non-monotonicity of negation as failure. The constructive interpreta-
tion of logic programs also provides us with a convenient framework for defining a 
ternary semantics for syntactically unrestricted programs. 
The constructive viewpoint also suggests a formalization of meta-programming. B y 
means of a few examples of meta-programs^ we have shown how logic program-
ming is closely related to other non-monotonic logics. We have shown how meta-
programming gives rise to elegant specifications of various logics that depart from 
the very semantics of logic programming. These specifications are as well implemen-
tations. Thus, although it implements a restricted, constructive fragment of classical 
logic, logic programming gives rise, through meta-programming, to overcoming its 
own limitation. 
We argue that it is preferable to specify refined forms of reasoning as logic meta-
programs, instead of developing new formalisms or new implementation paradigms, 
for the following reasons. First, constructive reasoning - the paradigm of logic 
programming - is very natural and intuitive. Second, the meta-programming ap-
proach gives rise to easily combining into one System, different forms of reasoning. 
Finally, program transformation techniques - in particular partial evaluation, see, 
e.g., [SS86a] - have been developed for automatically generating efficient implemen-
tations from specifications in form of logic meta-programs. 
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